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MAKING SENSE OF
ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS
Brian Slattery'
Toronto
This paper proposes a basic framework for understanding the decisions of the
Supreme Court ofCanada relating to aboriginal and treaty rights. It argues that
thefoundations ofthese rights lie in the common law doctrine ofaboriginal rights,
which originated in ancient custom generated by historical relations between the
Crown and indigenouspeoples, as informedby basic principles ofjustice. This sui
genesis doctrine is part of the common law of Canada and operates uniformly
across the country; italso providesthe contextfor interpreting section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The doctrine ofaboriginal rights has a number ofdistinct
branches. One branch governs treaties between indigenous peoples and the
Crown, and determines their basic status, existence, interpretation and effects.
Another branch deals with the various types of aboriginal rights, including
aboriginal title and the right ofself-government. Here, the doctrine distinguishes
between generic and specific rights, exclusive and non-exclusive rights, and
depletableand non-depletable rights. Still otherbranches ofthe doctrine articulate
the principles governing the operation of aboriginal customary law and the
fiduciary role of the Crown.
Cet article propose un cadre de référence pour comprendre les décisions de la
Cour suprême du Canada touchant les droits autochtones et les droits résultant de
traités. L'auteur y soutient que les fondements de ces droits reposent dans la
doctrine de droit commun sur les droits autochtones. Cette doctrine tire son
origine de l'ancienne coutume qui est née des rapports historiques entre la
Couronne et les peuples indigènes et qui a été influencée par les principes
fondamentaux de justice . Cette doctrine sui generis faitpartie du droit commun
canadien et s'applique uniformément à travers lepays; elle sert aussi de contexte
pour l'interprétation de l'article 35, paragraphe un de l'Acte constitutionnel de
1982. La doctrine des droits autochtones comporte un certain nombre de branches.
L'une d'elles régit les traités entre la Couronne et les peuples indigènes; elle en
détermine le statut de base, l'existence, l'interprétation et les effets . Une autre
branche concerne les divers types de droits autochtones, incluant letitre autochtone
et le droità l'autonomie gouvernementale. En cela, la doctrine distingue les droits
généraux etparticuliers, les droits exclusifs etnon exclusifs, les droits susceptibles
d'être épuisés et ceux qui ne le peuvent pas . D'autres branches de la doctrine
établissentlesprincipesquigouvernentl'application dudroitcoutumierautochtone
et le rôle defiduciaire de la Couronne.

* Brian Slattery, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario .
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1. Introduction

Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court of Canada has begun remapping
the neglected territory of aboriginal and,treaty rights . Ithas done so piecemeal,
in a series of important decisions extending from Caldetl in 1973 to the recent
Marshall case? When it started, the Court had little to go on . The results of
previous forays into this territory had been uncertain at best and misleading at
worst . The leading authority on the subject, the Privy Council decision in St.
Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company,3 was replete with dubious
assumptions and obscure terminology. In effect, the Supreme Courtinherited a
sketch map of shadowy coasts and fabulous isles, with monsters at every turn.
Let it be said that the Supreme Court has fared well in its initial ventures .
Little-known areas have been brought to light and apocryphal seas dispelled.
We nowknowbroadly what is terrafirma and whatis not, and the monsters have
beenlargelytamed orbanished to thedecorative margins. Nevertheless, the first
fruits ofthe Court's labours amount to a series of explorer's charts, enlightening
so far as they go, but covering differentareas, drawn in varying projections, and
sometimes bearing an uncertain relation to one another. We lack a reliable
mappamundi . The purpose of this paper is to attempt such a map - one that
surveys the subject as a whole, and displays the various parts in their proper
dimensions and inter-relationships .
We start with the common law doctrine of aboriginalrights and examine its
two major sources: ancient custom and basic principles of justice. We then
consider treaties between indigenous. peoples and the Crown and discuss their
status and effects.We conclude with a review of the various types ofaboriginal
rights, focussing on the distinctions between generic and specific rights,
exclusive and non-exclusive rights, and depletable and non-depletable rights .
i. Calder v: British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S .C .R . 313 .
R. v. Marshall, [1999] 4 C.N .L .R. 161 (S .C.C .).
St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888),

14 A .C. 46 (P .C .).
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H. The Common Law Doctrine ofAboriginal Rights

The indigenous peoples of Canada originally had the status of independent
entities ininternational law, holding title to their territories and ruling themselves
under their own laws .4 However, by a variety of historical processes spread
over several centuries, their position changed and they became protected
nations, connected by binding links to the Crown, which assumed the role of
overall suzerain .5 The relationship between indigenous peoples and the Crown
is governed by a distinct branch of law known as the doctrine of aboriginal
rights .

In a nutshell, the doctrine of aboriginal rights is a body of Canadian
common law6 that defines the constitutional links between aboriginal peoples
and the Crown and governs the interplay between indigenous systems of law,
rights and government (based on aboriginal customary law) and standard
systems oflaw, rights and government (based on English and French law). The
doctrine of aboriginal rights is a form of "inter-societal" law, in the sense that
it regulates the relations between aboriginal communities and the other
communities that make up Canada and determines the way in which their
respective legal institutions interact.?
Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), supra note 1, per Hall J. at 383, quoting
Worcesterv. Georgia, 6 Peters 515 (U .S .S .C .1832), at 542-43 ; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S .C.R.
1025 at 1053 ; B. Slattery, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) 29 Osg.
Hall L.J. 681. The terms"indigenous peoples", "aboriginal peoples", and "Indian peoples"

willbe used interchangeably in this paper. In ordinary discourse, the term "Indian" usually
has a narrower meaning, which excludes Inuit and M6tis peoples, however in Canadian
legal usage it often refers to indigenous peoples generally.
Thisdistinctive statusis reflected in the RoyalProclamation of]763, which speaks
of "the several Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We are connected, and who live
under OurProtection ..."; Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, in C.S. Brigham, ed.,
BritishRoyalProclamationsRelating toAmerica (Worcester, Mass. :AmericanAntiquarian
Society, 1911), 212. The term "suzerain" is more apt than "sovereign" in this context
because it accommodates the existence of protected political entities that retain their
collective identities and some measure of internal autonomy.
By "Canadian common law", I mean simply the unwrittenlaw appliedby Canadian
courts, whether in "common law" or "civil law" jurisdictions. I do not mean English
common law, as received in certain parts of Canada . In certain spheres (notably that of
aboriginal rights), Canadian common law operates uniformly across the country.
The concept that the law of aboriginal rights is "inter-societal" was endorsed in R.
v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 547, citing M. Walters, "British Imperial
Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights : A Comment on Delgamurrkw v. British
Columbia" (1992) 17 Queen's L.J. 350, at 412-13 ; B. Slattery, "The Legal Basis of
Aboriginal Title", in F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in British Columbia . Delgamuukw
v. The Queen (Lantzville, B .C. : Oolichan Books, 1992), at 120-21 ; and B. Slattery,
"Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can . Bar Rev. 727, at 737. See also: J.
Borrows & L. I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a
Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev . 9. Of course, the various communities that make up
Canada overlap; an individual may be a member of an aboriginal nation, a Nova Scotian
and a Canadian simultaneously.
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The doctrine of aboriginal rights has two main sources. The first source is
a distinctive body of custom generated by the intensive relations between
indigenous peoples and the British Crown in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. This body of custom coalesced into a branch ofBritishimperial law,
as the Crown gradually extended its protective sphere in North America. Upon
the, emergence of Canada as an independent federation, it became part of the
fundamental Canadian common law that underpins the Constitution .
The second source of the doctrine of aboriginal rights consists of basic
principles of justice. These principles have broad philosophical foundations,
whichdo not depend onhistorical practice or theactual tenor ofCrownrelations
with aboriginal peoples. They provide the doctrine of aboriginal rights with its
inner core of values and mitigate the rigours of a strictly positivistic approach
to law. Basic principles of justice have always informed the -common law
doctrine of aboriginal rights to some extent . However, in modern times, their
influence has been enhanced by theentrenchment of aboriginal andtreaty rights
in s. 35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982 .8 These two sources - historical and
philosophical - operate in tandem to support and nourish the doctrine of
aboriginal rights in Canadian law. The two sources are not completely distinct
butinteract inmyriad and,complex ways : correcting, completing andreinforcing
each other.
As fundamental law, the doctrine of 'aboriginal rights operates uniformly
throughout Canada . This holds true despite the fact that the various territories
comprising Canada have distinctive histories and laws and were acquired bythe
Crown in different ways . So, the operation of the doctrine of aboriginal rights
is not affected by the fact that French civil law is the basis of private law in
Quebec whileEnglish commonlaw is the foundationallaw in therest ofCanada.
This uniformity is explained by the distinctive origins of the doctrine and its
status as federal common law.9 The following sections explore these points in
greater detail .

ConstitutionAct,1982, being ScheduleB tothe CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 .
In R. v . CÔt2, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, at 173, the Court stated thatthe law ofaboriginal
title"represents adistinct species offederal common lawrather than a simple subset of the
common or civil law or property law operating within the province ...... citing Roberts v.
Canada, [1989] 1 S .C.R . 322 (S .C .C .), at 340, and Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal- Peoples, Self-Government, and the
Constitution (Ottawa:Minister ofSupply andServices Canada; -1993), at 20. For discussion,
see J. .M. Evans &. B. Slattery, "Case Note : Federal Jurisdiction-Pendent PartiesAboriginal Title and Federal Common Law-Charter Challenges-Reform Proposals:
Roberts v. Canada" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 817, at 829-32 .
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A. Ancient Customlo
The principal source of the doctrine of aboriginal rights is an ancient body
of inter-societal custom that emerged from relations between British colonies
and neighbouring Indian nations in eastern North America. I I The principles
informing this body of custom were suggested by the actual circumstances of
life in America, the laws and practices of indigenous societies, imperial law and
policy, andbroad considerations ofcomity andjustice . As early as the seventeenth
century, certain elements of these principles can be discerned in aboriginalBritish practice emanating from New England, New York, Virginia, and other
English settlements along the Atlantic seaboard . They assumed more definite
forms during the eighteenth century and were reflected in numerous AngloIndian treaties and Crown instruments. 12 By the time the Royal Proclamation
ofl76313 was issued, they had coalesced into a distinct branch of common law
now known as the doctrine of aboriginal rights. This doctrine formedpart ofthe
special body of British law dealing with the Crown's overseas dominions "imperial constitutional law", or "imperial law" for short . 14
The doctrine of aboriginal rights developed at the same time as other basic
doctrines of British imperial law and shared essentially the same juridical
character. Just as imperial law governed such matters as the status of colonies
and their lands, the application of English law, and the relative powers oflocal
assemblies and the Imperial Parliament, it also harboured rules concerning the
status of indigenous peoples and their lands, the operation oftheir laws, and the
relationship between aboriginal and colonial institutions .
to This section draws on B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights", supra note
7 at 728-29, 736-41 .
11 The process is well-described by Strong J. in St. Catharine's Milling andLumber Co .
v. The Queen (1887),13 S.C.R. 577, at 607-16, quoted with approval by Hall J. in Calder v.
British Columbia (A.G.), supra note 1 at 376-79. See also B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien
Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 1983), at 17-38; B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights", supra
note 7 at 732-41 ; B. Slattery, "TheLegal Basis ofAboriginal Title", supra note 7 at 113-21 ;
J. Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative
Community between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode HallL.J. 623; J.
Borrows, "With orWithout You: First Nations Law (in Canada)" (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629 .
12 See M. D. Walters, "Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal
Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North America" (1995)
33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 785 ; B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples
(D.Phil. Thesis, OxfordUniversity, 1979; reprint, Saskatoon : University ofSaskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 1979), at 95-282 .
13 Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, in C.S. Brigham, ed., British Royal
Proclamations Relating to America, supra at 212 . For the Proclamation's meaning and
effects, see J. Borrows, "Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective : Self
Government and the Royal Proclamation" (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev . 1 ; B. Slattery, The
Land Rights ofIndigenous Canadian Peoples, supra note 12 at 191-349.
14 For the status ofimperial law,seeB. Slattery, "The Independence ofCanada" (1983)
5 Supreme Court L.R. 369, at 375-84 . In older usage, imperial law is often described as
"colonial law".
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The doctrine of aboriginal rights, like other doctrines of imperial law,
applied automatically to a new colony when it was acquired .ls As such, the
doctrine furnished the presumptive legal structure governing the position of
indigenous peoples throughout Britishterritories in NorthAmerica. The doctrine
applied, then, to every former British territory now incorporated in Canada,
from Newfoundland to British Columbia, and from Quebec in the south to
Rupert's Land;in .the north. Although,the doctrine was a species of unwritten
British law, it was not English common law in the narrow sense, and its
application to a colony did not depend on whether or not English law was
imported enbloc. Itwas part of alargerbody offundamental constitutional law
that governed a colony regardless whether the local law was English, French,
aboriginal, or some other type . Thus, the doctrine of aboriginal rights
automatically extended to New France when GreatBritain acquired theterritory
in 1760-63, and the doctrine was not affected by the subsequent confirmation
of local French ; law in the Quebec Act of 1774.16.. As such, the doctrine limits
the extent to which French civil law applies to indigenous peoples in Quebec,
just as it curtails the application of English common law in the rest of Canada .
This consideration explains the continuance of indigenous customary law
in Canada, a phenomenon long recognized in our courts (if not always wellunderstood) . -17 When the Crown gained suzerainty over a North American
territory, the doctrine of aboriginal rights provided that the local customs of the
indigenous peoples would presumptively continue in force, except insofar as
they were unconscionable or incompatible with the Crown's suzerainty. This
provision resembles theimperial rule governing conquered andceded colonies,
which holds that the local law ofthe colony remains in force, subject to similar
exceptions . However, the doctrine of aboriginal rights has abroader application
than the imperial rule regarding conquests and takes effect regardless whether
the territory was acquired by conquest, cession, settlement, annexation, tacit
acquiescence, or some other method. It should be stressed that the doctrine is
distinct from the rule governing the survival oflocal custom in England andis
animated by different considerations . It would be as inappropriate to apply the
tests governing English local custom to aboriginal peoples as it would be to
saddle them with the rule against perpetuities .
The Quebec case of Connolly v. Woolrich (1867) 18 provides an interesting
example of the doctrine's operation. In that case, the courts considered the,
validity . of a marriage contracted in the Canadian North-West under Cree
customary law between an Indian woman and a man ofEuropean descent. The
is See R. v. Cbté, supra note 9 at 173; citing B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal
Rights", supra note 7 at 737-38 .
16 14 Geo. III, c . 83 (U.K.) .
17 See, e.g., Re Noah Estate (1961),
32 D.L.R. 185 (N.W.T.T.C.), and N. K. Zlotkin,
"Judicial Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law in Canada: Selected Marriage and
Adoption Cases" [1984] 4 C.N.L .R. 1 .
18 Connolly v. Woolrich (1867),17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Qu6 . S<C.); reproducedin 1 C.N.L.C.
70. Thedecision was upheld onappeal subnom. Johnstonev. Connolly (1869),17 R.J.R.Q.
266 (Qu6 . Q.B .); 1 C.N.L.C. 151.
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courts upheld the marriage, notwithstanding the fact that the man had later
purported to marry another woman in a Christian ceremony under Qu6bec law.
In attempting to discredit the firstmarriage, the second wife argued thatEnglish
common law had beenintroduced into the North-West beforethe marriage took
place, thus invalidating Indian custom. In any case, she said, the marriage
customs of the Cree could not be recognized by the courts, even as among the
Cree themselves. These arguments did not persuade the trial judge. He noted
that the first English and French settlers in the North-West found the country in
the possession of numerous and powerful Indian tribes. Even if the settlers
brought with them the laws of their mother countries,
yet, willit be contended thatthe territorial rights, political organization, suchasitwas,
orthe laws and usages ofthe Indian tribes, were abrogated; that they ceased to exist,
whenthese two European nations began to trade with the aboriginal occupants?In my
opinion, it is beyond controversy that they did not, that so far from being abolished,
they were left infull force,and werenotevenmodified in the slightest degree, in regard
to the civil rights of the natives .19
Fromits origins in British imperial law, the doctrine ofaboriginalrights has
passed into Canadian common law and operates uniformly across Canada .20
The doctrine was inherited not only by Canada but also by the United States after
the American Revolution . A series of early decisions written by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court review the history of British
dealings with indigenous peoples in America and identify certain principles
implicit in those dealings.21 These decisions perform for the doctrine of
aboriginal rights what Lord Mansfield's celebrated decision in Campbell v.
Hall22 performs for other principles of imperial law, providing structure and
coherence to an untidy and diffuse body of common law based on official
practice .23 While the Marshall decisions deal with the distinctive situation of
the United States, they identify a number of basic principles that have an
obvious relevance to Canada and have won the approval of our courts .
The recent decisions ofthe Supreme Court ofCanada testify tothe common
law foundations of aboriginal rights .24 In dealing with such subjects as the
19 Connolly v. Woolrich, ibid. at 84.
20 Thetransformation ofimperiallegal principles intorules ofCanadian common law
is examined in B . Slattery, "The Independence ofCanada", supra note 14 at 390-92.
21 See esp. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C. 1823) ; Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Peters 515 (U.S .S.C. 1832) .
22 (1774), Lofft 655 (K.B .).
23 R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 7 at 541, citing an earlier version of this passage in
B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights", supra note 7 at 739 .
24 See esp. Roberts v. Canada, supra note 9 at 340 ; R. v. Van derPeet, supra note 7
at 538 ; R. v. Côté, supra note 9 at 173-74 ; J. M. Evans & B. Slattery, "Case Note: Federal
Jurisdiction-Pendent Parties-Aboriginal Title and Federal Common Law-Charter
Challenges-Reform Proposals: Roberts v. Canada", supra note 9 at 829-32 ; Royal
Commission on AboriginalPeoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, SelfGovernment, and the Constitution (Ottawa : Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1993), supra note 9 at 20.
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existence and nature of aboriginal title, the.character of customary rights, the
fiduciary obligations of the Crown, and the effects of Indian treaties, the Court
treats them as matters of Canadian common law, which exists independently of
statute or executive order. The Court clearly assumes that the common law
governing these subjects is uniformand does not varyfromplace toplace. There
is, no suggestion that the law is unique to the specific. provinces under
consideration. This uniformity means that for many purposes there is no need
to determine precisely which territories are covered by the Indian provisions of
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 . While there is reason to think that the
Proclamation's basic provisions apply across Canada, 25 the question is rendered
moot by the fact that the common law principles reflected in the Proclamation
are in force throughout the entire country.
. The fruits ofthis approach are evident in the Guerin case, 26 whichinvolved
an action by the Musqueam band . of British Columbia against the, federal
government. Theband possessedvaluable reserve landsin the City ofVancouver.
They alleged that, in 1957, the government induced them to surrender part of
their reserve to the Crown for leasing to a golf club, with the rent to be applied
to the band's account. After obtaining the surrender from the band, the
governmentleasedthelandtothe golf club forseventy-five yearsonterms much
less favourable than the band had agreed to and did not even give them a copy
of the lease until twelve years later. Evidence showed that the lands were
potentially among the most valuable in Vancouver and could have commanded
a muchhigher rent. The band argued that the government was guilty ofabreach
of trust, and asked for damages. The government responded that it was not
legally responsible to the band for what it did with the lands after the surrender.
In effect, it mighthave leased the lands on whatever terms it saw fit, regardless
ofwhat ithad told the band earlier. The government's only responsibility to the
band.was political rather than legal.
The Supreme Courtunanimously rejectedthe government's arguments and
held itlegally accountable for its actions, awarding the band ten million dollars
in damages. The principal opinion was written by Dickson J., who based his
decision squarely . on the concept of aboriginal land rights . He held that
aboriginal title is a legal right derived from the indigenous peoples' historic
occupation of their lands. That title both pre-dated and survived the claims to
sovereignty made byEuropean nations incolonizing North America. Although
aboriginal title was recognized in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, it has an
independent basis in Canadian common law. It entitles indigenous peoples to
possess their homelands until their title is extinguished by a voluntary cession
to the Crown or by legislation. As provided in the Proclamation, aboriginal
25 See K. M. Narvey, "The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763-. The Common
Law, and Native Rights to Land within the Territory Granted to the Hudson's Bay
Company" (1973-74) 38 Sask. L. Rev. 123;B ., Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous
Canadian Peoples, supra note 12 at 175-282; B. Slattery, "TheLegal Basis of Aboriginal
Title", supra, note 7 at 121-29 .
26 Guerin
v. The Queen, [198412 S.C.R. 335.

204

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol .79

peoples have a special relationship with the Crown whereby they cannot dispose
of their lands to thirdparties but may only cede them to the Crown. As such, the
Crown serves as an intermediary between aboriginal peoples and individuals
wishing to purchase or lease their lands. This relationship gives rise to a
distinctivefiduciary obligation on the part ofthe Crown to deal with ceded lands
for the benefit of the aboriginal peoples . Ifthe Crown fails in the performance
of its fiduciary duties, it is liable in damages .
In Guerin, then, the Court treats arule embodied in the RoyalProclamation
of 1763 as operable in British Columbia, without entering into the question
whether the Proclamation as such applies there.27 Guerin also stands for the
proposition that statutes and other acts concerning aboriginal people should be
read in the light of the common law of aboriginal rights, and the Court adopts
this approach in interpreting the provisions ofthe Indian Act.28 By implication,
the common law also provides the context for understanding treaties signed
with Indian nations, as well as such important constitutional provisions as s.
91(24) ofthe ConstitutionAct,1867,29 and ss. 25 and 35 ofthe ConstitutionAct,
1982.
As a common law doctrine, albeit a fundamental one, the doctrine of
aboriginal rights could in principle be overridden or modified by legislation
passed by a competent legislature, in the absence ofconstitutional barriers such
as those embodied in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. This conclusion flows from a standard doctrine of
British law attributing paramountcy to Acts ofParliament.30 It seems doubtful
whether aboriginal peoples initially understood or accepted the principle that
theirbasic rights could be unilaterally alteredby statute, and Crown agents were
often less than candid on this point when they negotiated treaties with Indian
nations . Nevertheless, in practice, the impact of the doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty has been muted by the fact that, throughout much of Canadian
history, the powers of local Canadian legislatures to affect aboriginal rights
have been subject to certain constitutional restrictions .31
The doctrine ofaboriginalrights has anumberofdistinct branches . The part
dealing specifically with aboriginal lands is called the doctrine of aboriginal
title.32 Other branches of the doctrine deal with such matters as customary
rights, powers of self-government, the fiduciary role of the Crown, and the
status and effects of treaties. Here we can only sketch the outlines of these
subjects and indicate their inter-relationships .

Ibid. Dickson J. at 376-79, 383-84, Estey J. at 392 .
Ibid. esp. Dickson J. at 383-87, Wilson J. at 348-50 .
29 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
30 For the genesis ofthis doctrine in the colonial context, see B. Slattery, The Land
Rights ofIndigenous Canadian Peoples, supra note 12 at 384-90 .
31 See B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights", supra note 7 at 774-82.
32 R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 7 at 540.
27
29
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B . Basic Principles of Justice
As just seen, the origins of the doctrine of aboriginal rights canbe traced to
the customary modus vivendi reached between aboriginal peoples and the
British Crown during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as reflected in
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 . However, the doctrine's inner dynamic has
always been linked to fundamental principles of justice, as expressed in the
distinctive fiduciary role assumed by the Crown as the protector of aboriginal
peoples-a role encapsulated in the phrase "the honour of theCrown" .33 These
basic principles of justice constitute the second major source of the doctrine of.
aboriginal rights .
In recent years, the influence of this source has been enhanced by the
enactment of s. 35(1), Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms
existing aboriginal and treaty rights . The broad significance of this provision
was underlined by the Supreme Courtin the landmark Sparrowdecision.34 The
Courtindicated that s. 35(1) places aboriginal and treaty rights on a new footing
and infuses,them with the fundamental values and principles that pervade the
Constitution of Canada as a whole. So doing, it renounces the old colonial
framework, which at times arguably recognized aboriginal and treaty rights
only in partial and, attenuated forms and subordinated them to the will of
Parliament. At the same,time, s. 35(1) indicates that the.past cannot be entirely
reversed. It limits the scope of the, section to the "existing" rights of the.
aboriginal peoples. This word serves to indicate that certain rights originally
held by aboriginal peoples were extinguished prior to 1982 and cannot be
revivedwithout injustice to thirdparties or serious disruption of the socialorder .
Such rights do not qualify as "existing" rights and do not gain theprotection of
the section.
The concrete implications of this approach were spelled out in the Côté
case .35 The appellants, who were members of the Algonquin people, were
convictedofregulatory offences arisingfrom an expedition to awilderness zone
in the ®utaouais region of Qu6bec . The purpose of the expedition was to teach
traditional hunting and fishing techniques to young aboriginal students . The
appellants asserted that they were exercising aboriginal rights under s. 35(1).
The Crown replied that no aboriginal rights could have survived the French
assertion of sovereignty over New France because under French colonial law
the'Crown assumed full ownership of all lands in the territory. In deciding the
case, the Supreme Court expressed its scepticism of the Crown's account of the
status of aboriginal rights under the French legal regime . However, it held that
the case could be resolved simply on the basis of s. 35(1), which "changed the
landscape of aboriginal rights in Canada". The advent ofFrench sovereignty did
33 See R. .v . Sparrow, [199011 S.C.R. 1075, at 1107-10;R. v . Van derPeet, supra note
7 at 536-37 .
34 R . v. Sparrow, ibid . esp . at 1091, 1103-06. .
35 R. v . Côté, supra note 9 at 168-75, See also R . v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, at
120-22 .
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not negate the potential existence of aboriginal rights in New France for the
purposes of s. 35(1). If practices, customs and traditions central to aboriginal
societies continued after European contact, they were entitled to constitutional
protection under s. 35(1) unless specifically extinguished. The absence of
formal recognition in French colonial law should not underminethat protection .
The French regime's failure to recognize legally a specific aboriginal practice
cannot be equated with a "clear and plain" intention to extinguish the practice,
as s. 35(1) requires .
The Court observed that the Crown's argument would create an awkward
patchwork of constitutional protection for aboriginal rights across Canada,
depending on the distinctive historical patterns of colonization prevailing in
different regions . Such a "static and retrospective" interpretation of s. 35(1)
could notbereconciled with the noble andprospective purpose of constitutional
entrenchment. It would risk undermining the very rationale of the section, by
"perpetuating thehistorical injustice suffered by aboriginalpeoples atthehands
of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre-existing
aboriginal societies." So, even assuming that the French Crown did not
recognize any aboriginal rights in New France, an aboriginal group could still
possess aboriginal rights within those territories for the purposes of s. 35(1).
Here the Supreme Court indicates that, in ascertaining the existence of
aboriginal rights under s. 35(1), it will notblindly endorse the tenets ofcolonial
legalregimes but will ensure that theinquiry is informed bybasic considerations
ofjustice. It will not allow s. 35(1) to be interpreted in a manner that simply
perpetuates historical injustices visited on aboriginal people in colonial times.
Inparticular, the Court rejects the view that the advent ofFrench sovereignty or
general principles of French colonial law were capable in themselves of
extinguishing aboriginal rights for the purposes of s. 35(1) . However, at the
sametime the Court acknowledges that aboriginal rights couldbe extinguished
by specific Crown acts that were sufficiently clear and plain.
III. Historic Treaties
From an early period in the European penetration ofNorth America, it became
customary for relations between the Crown and Indian nations to be conducted
by means of publicly negotiated agreements styled "treaties" . This practice,
which was well-established by the close of the seventeenth century, continued
into the early years of the twentieth century and more recently has been revived
as a mode of settling aboriginal claims. The contemporary pattern of treatymaking has changed significantly from the model of earlier eras and so is
governed by somewhat different considerations . Here, we will confine our
discussion to "historic treaties".36
36 We also leave aside inter-state treaties which contain undertakings regarding
indigenous peoples.
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In this context, the term "treaty" has been interpreted broadly as
encompassing all engagements made to aboriginal peoples by representatives
of the Crown or other persons in authority. As consensual agreements,
historic treaties vary widely in their terms3 8 However, just as ordinary
contracts are governed by uniform principles embodied in the overarching law
of contract, treaties are necessarily governed by auniform body of law, which
determines their existence; legal character, interpretation and effects. Which
body of law governs historic treaties between the Crown and aboriginal
peoples? Is it English common law, or the .customary . law of the aboriginal
people in question? Or is it perhaps international law? This inquiry touches on themuch-debated question whetherIndian treaties,
considered as a class, are international agreements or domestic agreements
governed by Canadian law.39 However, as traditionally framed, this question
poses false alternatives . It seems unlikely that all agreements styled "Indian
treaties" share exactly the same -legal character. A different conclusion is
suggested by the widely varying circumstances in whichhistoric treaties were
concluded and the disparate purposes they served. In any case, there is reason
to thinkthat some treatiesconstitute both internationalanddomestic instruments,
producing legal effects at both levels . International law and Canadian law are
distinct and potentially overlapping systems of rules. On occasion, bothsystems
may recognize certain transactions as valid and attach legal consequences to
them, each within its proper sphere . Here we will not be able to examine the international status of Indian
treaties and will confine our attention to their position inCanadianlaw. Viewed
in this context, it seems clear that historic treaties are governed, neither by
English common law nor aboriginal customary law, but by a unique body of
treaty law that forms abranch ofthedoctrine of aboriginal rights . As withother
facets of the doctrine, this body of treaty law was generated by long-standing
customary relations between aboriginal peoples and the Crown and is informed
by basic principles of justice which engage the Crown's honour. So, the law of
Indian treaties is sui generis anddoes notnecessarily conformwithinternational
law, Englishcontract law oraboriginal custom.40 For example, ancientpractice
attests that Indian treaties bind (and benefit) not only the individuals who were
members of the aboriginal group at the time the treaty was concluded, but also
individuals born into that group at later periods. This rule holds true even
assuming that it violates English rules regarding third party beneficiaries of a
contract .
37 Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S .C.R. 387, at 408-09 ; R. v . Sioui, supra note 4 at
1035-45 .
38 R. v . Sundown, [1999] 1 S .C .R . 393, at para. 25 .
39 See, e.g., Simon v. The Queen, supra note 37 at 398-401 ; R . v. Sioui, supra note 4
at 1038, 1052-56 .
40 Simon v . The Queen, supra note 37 at 404; R. .v. Sioui, supra note 4 at 103
1056 ; R. v . Marshall, [1999] 4 C.N.L.R. 161 (S .C .C .),-at para . 44.
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Historic treaties were profoundly influencedby Indian concepts, procedures
and ceremonial and differed in a number of ways from treaties typical among
European states . The outstanding difference for our purposes is the fact that
normally they were oral rather than written agreements 41 An Indian treaty
typically took the form of a spoken exchange ofproposals and responses, often
marked by special rituals, andusually taking placein several sessions extending
over a number of days, leading to a firm understanding between the parties on
certain matters. In principle, the content of such a treaty can be discovered only
by consulting the oral exchanges to see which proposals were ultimately
accepted by the parties, with what variations, and under what conditions. For
thisreason, detailedwritten transcripts ofthe entire proceedings ofatreaty were
sometimes kept by the English parties, while the Aboriginal parties would
commit to memory the main terms of the oral agreement, using a variety of
memory-aids, including beaded belts.
At times, the English parties recorded some of thetreaty terms in a concise
written document that the Indian parties would be asked to "sign". Such a
document has sometimes come to be regarded as the "treaty". However, this
conclusion is usually unwarranted. In most cases, the treaty was the oral
agreement, and the written documentjustamemorial ofthat agreement, similar
in status to the belts used by some Indian parties. Many such documents have
proven to be unreliable guides to the oral compacts . They often record only
matters of particular interest to the English parties and omit certain terms of
significance to the Indian parties. Even the recorded terms may not representan
accurate or balanced account of the true oral bargain. The written documents
were oftentranslated to the Indian partiesin amanner allowing ample opportunity
for misunderstanding and distortion . Marks on a printed sheet of paper had
about as much significance for many aboriginal peoples as the colours and
patterns of a treaty belt had for many English. The treaty was neither the written
memorial nor the belt but the agreement reached by the parties during the oral
exchanges. In the absence ofcomplete transcripts ofthose proceedings, the true
content of a treaty can be determined only by a comprehensive assessment of
all available sources of information, including any written memorials or
accounts, butalso oral tradition, the broader social andpolitical objectives ofthe
parties, and the history of their relationship.
Treaties served a broad range of purposes . In early years, they were often
used to establish or confirm peace andfriendship between the parties, toregulate
matters oftrade, to cement military andpolitical alliances against othernations,
or to resolve particular disputes or grievances . On other occasions, they were
used to cede aboriginal lands to the Crown in return for stated benefits, to draw
boundaries between aboriginal territories and areas open to settlement, or to
describe in detail the limits of lands reserved for indigenous peoples within
larger tracts ceded to the Crown.
41 R. v. Badger, (199611 S .C.R. 771, at 798-99, 800-03 ; R. v. Sacndown, supra note
38 at para . 24; R. v. Marshall, ibid. at paras. 14, 19, 40.

2000]

Making Sense ofAboriginal and Treaty Rights

209

Despite these differences, many historic treaties are best understood as

constitutional agreements, which establish or reaffirm a fundamental and

enduring relationship between the Crown and an aboriginal people, and which
evolve over time in response to new conditions . True, not allhistoric treaties fit
this mould. Each treaty must be assessed in its own terms. But many historic
treaties cannot readily be understood apart from the fact that the parties
occupied a unique position vis-a-vis each other in Canadian law - the Crown
as ultimate suzerain and protector, holding certain fiduciaryobligations, andthe
aboriginal party as aprotected andpartially autonomous entity, owing ultimate
allegiance to the Crown, but capable of acting independently within its own
sphere of authority.
Are the terms of an historic treaty limited to those explicitly articulated by
the parties, whether in the oral negotiations or the written memorial? Or do they
also include certain implied terms based on the customary relations between the
parties and any underlying assumptions? In the Marshall case,42 the Supreme
Court took the latter view . Justice Binnie notedthat, even under generalcontract
law, it is recognized that when parties enter into agreements they make certain
assumptions that give their arrangements efficacy . In such instances, courts_will
read an implied term into the contract on the basis of the presumed intentions
of the parties where it is necessary to ensure the contract's efficacy, that is,
where it meets the "officious bystander test". Binnie J. went on to holdIf the law is prepared to supply the deficiencies of written contracts prepared by
sophisticated parties and theirlegal advisors in orderto produce a sensible result that
accords with the intent of both parties, though unexpressed, the law cannot askless of
the honour and dignity of the Crown in its dealings with First Nations.
Problems have arisen in the interpretation-of many historic treaties . In light
of the fiduciary obligations owed by the Crown to aboriginal peoples, the
Supreme Court has held that treaty terms, both oral and written, should be
interpreted generously, in a manner that is favourable to the aboriginal parties
and -takes full account of their concerns and perspectives in entering into the
treaty 43 Moreover, treaty provisions are not "frozen-in-time" but should be
interpreted in a flexible and evolutionary manner that is sensitive to changing
conditions and practices 44
Questions have also arisen as to the enforceability of Indian treaties against
the Crown. It now seems clear that, underCanadian common law, historic treaties
are binding on the Crown and enforceable in its courts45 This conclusion is
supported by a number,of considerations . It would be incongruous if the
42 R. v. Marshall, supra note 40 at para . 43 .
43 Simon v. The Queen, supra note 37 at 402; R. v . Sioui, supra note,4 at 1035-36; R.
v. Badger, supra note 41 at 794, 798-99 .
44 Simon v. The Queen, supra note 37 at 402-03 ; .R . v. Sundown; supra note 38 at
para.32; R. v. Marshall, supra note 40 at para . 53 .
45 Simon v. The Queen, supra note 37 at 408-09 ; R. v. Sioui, supra note 4 at 1063 ; R.
v. Badger, supra note 41 at 793-94.
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Crown could now deny that it is bound by such treaties after consistently
representing the contrary to aboriginal peoples overaperiodofseveral centuries .
In equity, the Crown cannot be permitted to impugn the binding force of
statements that have induced another party to surrender certain rights or
otherwise alter its position to its detriment, as by accepting the suzerainty of the
Crown or ceding tracts of aboriginal lands .46
Prior to 1982, treaties were subject to the doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty, which held that a competent legislature might enact statutes
infringing the terms of an Indian treaty.47 Nevertheless, courts should hold
legislatures to a high standard of clarity in this area.48 It cannot be lightly
presumed that the Crown in Parliament would disregard promises made to an
aboriginal group to which it owes fiduciary obligations . Ofcourse, since 1982,
a court may strike downlegislation inconsistent withthe terms ofIndiantreaties,
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . 49
What is the relationship between treaty rights and aboriginal rights?
Clearly, the relationship may vary, depending on the precise terms of the treaty
and the overall context . In some cases, the treaty may recognize and guarantee
certain existing aboriginal rights. In other instances, it may alter aboriginal
rights, as by consolidating them, redefining them, sharing them, ceding them,
or reshaping them in some other fashion . Where a treaty recognizes and
guarantees aboriginal rights, it does not convert them into treaty rights, in the
absence of very clear language to that effect. Treaty rights throw a protective
mantle over aboriginal rights, providing an extra layer of security.50 The latter
become "treaty-protected" aboriginal rights.
What does this additional layer ofprotection entail? First, where the Crown
guarantees certain aboriginal rights in a treaty, it forfeits any asserted power to
alter those rights by a unilateral prerogative act - that is, a Crown act not
supported by legislation enacted in Parliament or by a treaty with the affected
aboriginal group . According to some views, the Crown held special prerogative
powers to deal with aboriginal peoples, which it could exercise by simple royal
46 Guerin v. The Queen, supra note 26 at 388-89; R. v.Maishall, supra note40atpara.
48.

41

Simon v. The Queen, supra note 37 at 411 ; R. v. Marshall, supra note 40 at para.

48 Simon v. The Queen, supra note 37 at405-06 ; R. v. Sioui, supra note 4 at 1061; R.
v. Badger, supranote41 at794 . InR. v. Marshall,supra note40 atpara. 48, Binnie J. states
that prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, "the treaty rights of aboriginal
peoples could be overridden by competent legislation as easily as could the rights and
liberties of other inhabitants ." However, in light ofhis subsequent discussion of the strict
interpretive principles flowing from the "honour of the Crown" (in paras. 49-52), this
statement should be understood as referring simply to the question of Parliamentary
competence, rather than the applicable standards of interpretation.
49 R. v. Badger, supra note 41 at 812-16 ; R. v. Marshall, supra note 40 at para. 48.
50 Simon v. The Queen, supra note 37 at 401-02 ; see also R. v. Marshall, supra note
40 at para. 47.
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act, such as letters-patent or order-in-council . Whatever the accuracy of these
views, it is submitted that the Crown cannot exercise unilaterally any residual
prerogative powers in a manner inconsistent with an historic treaty .
Second, treaty undertakings made by the Crown to aboriginal peoples give
risetoparticularfiduciary obligations tohonourthoseundertakings -obligations
that represent concrete instances of the Crown's more general fiduciary duties .
So, as noted above, legislation passed by the Crown in Parliament should be
construed as respecting the Crown's treaty undertakings, in the absence of
language that specifically overrides the treaty provision. It is submitted that the
requisite degree of legislative clarityis significantly higher in relation to treaty
rights. than itis to aboriginal rights, otherwise the treaty undertakings wouldnot
have he effect of reinforcing aboriginal rights, which are already protected by
a rule of interpretation requiring "clear and plain" legislation.
IUT. Classes ofAboriginal Rights

Aboriginal rights take many forms; however they also share certain general
characteristics and sofall naturally into anumber of classes, which we will now
review . While our discussion focuses on aboriginal rights, some of our
observations apply by extension to treaty rights, and we will draw several
examples from that area. The links between aboriginal and treaty rights are not
surprising because, as just noted, many treaty provisions reflect .pre-existing
aboriginal rights .
A. Generic and Specific Rightssl
Aboriginal rights fallinto two broad categories, which for convenience we
maycall generic rights and specific rights .52 A generic aboriginalrightis aright
of a standardized character held by all aboriginal groups that satisfy certain
criteria. The basic contours of a generic right are determined by general
principles oflawrather than aboriginal practices, customs and traditions. So the
broad dimensions of the right are identical in all groups where the right arises,
even if certain concrete features of the right may vary somewhat from group to
group. By contrast, a specific aboriginal right is aright distinctive to aparticular
aboriginal group. The overall dimensions of_ the right are determined by the
historical practices, customs and traditions ofthegroupinquestion . So, specific
rights may differ substantially in form and content from group to group.

This section draws on B . Slattery, "Varieties of Aboriginal Rights" (1998) 6
Canada Watch 71.
52 LamerC.J.C. tacitly recognizes adistinctionofthis kind in Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at 1095-97; see also the remarks ofLa Forest I at 112651
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Aboriginal title provides a good example of a generic right. In the

Delganauuk-w case, Chief Justice Lamer holds that aboriginal title is governed

by two principles 53 First, title gives an aboriginal group the right to the
exclusive use and occupation of the land for a broad variety of purposes. These
purposes do not need to be grounded in the historical practices, customs and
traditions of the group. So, the group is free to use its lands in ways that differ
from the ways in which the land was traditionally used. A group that lived
mainly by hunting, fishing and gathering at the time of European sovereignty
is free to farm the land, to ranch on it, to use it for eco-tourism or to exploit its
natural resources. Second, lands held under aboriginal title cannot be used in a
manner that is irreconcilable with the fundamental nature of the group's
attachment to the land, so that the land may be preserved for use by future
generations. In otherwords, the group maynotruinthe land orrender it unusable
for its original purposes . These two principles define the basic contours of
aboriginal title in all cases. As such, aboriginal title qualifies as a generic right.
Nevertheless, itcanbe seen that theconcrete application of the second principle
is partly governed bya factor particular to the group-thenature of the group's
original attachment to the land. So, while aboriginal title is basically a generic
right, in one aspect it resembles a specific right.
Aboriginal title is not the only example of a generic right. For instance, an
aboriginal right to speak an indigenous language would likely also be generic,
because the basic structure of the right would presumably be identical in all
groups whereit arises, even though thespecific languages protected would vary
from group to group. As we will see later, the aboriginal right of selfgovernment is probably also a generic right, because the powers of aboriginal
governments and their place in the Canadian federal scheme are governed by
uniform legal principles, even ifthe concrete forms that aboriginal governments
take may often diverge.
By contrast, as stated in the Van der Peet case, 54 the character of a specific
aboriginal rightis determined by the historical practices, customs and traditions
of the particular group in question and so differ from group to group. Specific
aboriginal rights may be classified in three groups, according to their degree of
connection with the land .ss The first group comprises site-specific rights rights that relate to a definite tract ofland but do not amount to aboriginal title.
53 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, ibid. at 1083-91. For discussion, see K. McNeil,
"Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" (1998) 5
Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 253. The concept of aboriginal title is analysed in K. McNeil,
Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); K. McNeil, "The
Meaning ofAboriginal Title", in M. Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada,
(Vancouver: University ofBritish Columbia Press, 1997) ; P. Macklem, "What's Law Got
toDoWithit?The Protection ofAboriginal Title in Canada" (1997) 35 Osg. Hall L.J. 125.
54 R. v. Van derPeet, supra note 7. See also R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2
S.C .R. 672; R. v. Gladstone, [199612 S.C.R. 723.
55 This classification was suggested by the Court's observations in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, supra note 52 at 1094-95 . Note that a similar classification could be
applied to generic rights .
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For example, where an aboriginal people regularly hunted on certain lands
adjoining its ancestral territory but never.occupied them on a permanent basis,
it may nevertheless hold a site-specific hunting right in those lands56
The second group of specific aboriginal rights consists of land-based rights
that are not tied to any particular tract of land - what may be called floating
rights . A floating right is the rightto engage in certain land-related activities on
any lands to which members of the group have' access, whether as aboriginal
people or as ordinary members of the public . Consider the case where an
aboriginal group has traditionally gathered wild plants for medicinal purposes.
Letus suppose that these plants are not found in any particular place but grow
freely in various locations, which change from year to year. Ithappens that the
active ingredients in some of these plants are listed as "restricted drugs" in the
Food and Drugs Act.57 Ifmembers of the group were charged with possession
of restricted drugs under the Act, they might be able to defeat the charge by
establishing anaboriginalrightto gather the plants formedicinalpurposes. Here
the aboriginal right would be a "floating right" because, although it involves a
use of land, it is not tied to any specific tract of land .
In the third group we find specific aboriginal rights that are not necessarily
linked with the land at all - cultural rights for short. Like other specific rights,
culturalrights are grounded in thehistorical practices, customs and traditions of
a particular aboriginalgroup. Theirdistinguishing characteristicis thefactthey
do notinvolve any particular use of the land . For example, a group might have
an aboriginal right to perform certain traditional dances that are not connected
with any particular location and do not involve "using" the land in a way that
transcends the normal effects of human activity .
Although the distinction between -generic and specific rights is clear in
principle, it is less sharpinpractice . Whatthe courts initiallyregard as aspecific
right, distinctive to, a particular group, may later prove to be a concrete instance
of a generic right, ifrights sharing the same basic structure are found to exist in
a substantial number of-aboriginal societies..For example, a specific right to
perform certain religious rites might constitute the concrete manifestation of a
generic right to practice indigenous religions. In short, as the jurisprudence of
aboriginal rights evolves, specific rights may gradually be subsumed under
general headings relating to generic rights .
Is the right of self-government a generic or a specific aboriginal right? In
the Pamajewon case,58 the Court viewed the question of. self-government
throughthe lens of specific rights, as provided by the Van derPeetdecision, and
held that theright of self-government would have to be proved as an element of
specific practices, customs and traditions integral to the particular aboriginal
society in question. According to this approach, the right of self-government
would consistofabundle bf specific rights to govern particular activities rather
56
Delgamuukw v . British Columbia, ibid. at 1094-95 .
57 R.S .C . 1985, c. F-27, s. 46, and Schedule H.
58 R. v . Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C .R. 821, at 832-33 .
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than a generic right to deal with a range of more abstract subject-matters .
However, Pamajewon was decided before the Court's holding in Delgamuukw,
which significantly broadened our understanding of aboriginal rights and
furnished us with the alternative category of generic rights .
Inthe light ofDelgantuukw, itnow seems preferable to treat the right ofselfgovernment as a generic aboriginal right rather than as a bundle of specific
rights. On this view, the right of self-government is governed by uniform
principles laid down by Canadian common law. The basic structure ofthe right
does not vary from group to group; however its application to aparticular group
may differ depending on the local circumstances . This is the approach to the
right of self-government taken in the Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, which the Supreme Court cites in its brief comments on
self-government in Delgamuuklv . 59
However, it could be argued that certain observations in Delgatnuukw rule
out this approach. In declining to be drawn into an analysis of self-government,
the Court reiterates its holding in Pamajewon that rights to self-government
cannot beframed in "excessively general terms" . Itnotes that in the current case
the aboriginal parties advanced the right to self-government "in very broad
terms, and therefore in a manner not cognizable under s. 35(1)."60 On one
interpretation, these remarks support the view that the right of self-government
is abundle ofspecific rights, governed by the criterialaid down in Van der Peet.
However, I suggest that these comments are better read simply as a warning
against over-ambitious litigation, which attempts to induce the courts to settle
very abstract and difficult questions without an appropriate factual or
argumentative context. 6 l
Elsewhere in Delgamuukw, the Court indicates an approach to the question
of self-government that builds on the concept of aboriginal title . In discussing
the communal nature of the title, Lamer C.J. states :
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons ; it is acollective right
to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation . Decisions with respect to thatland
are also made by that community. 162
59 Delgamuukwv. British Columbia, supra note 52 at 1115; see Canada, Report ofthe
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group,
1996), Vol. 2, Part 1, especially at 163-280 . On the right of self-government, see P.
Macklem, "First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal
Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382; B. Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution:
AQuestion ofTrust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev.261 ; P. Macklem, "Distributing Sovereignty:
Indian Nations and Equality ofPeoples" (1993) 45 Stanf. L. Rev. 1311.
60 Delgamuukw v . British Columbia, supra note 52 at 1114-15 .
61 A sthe Courtstates : "The broad nature oftheclaim [of self-government] attrial also
led to a failure by the parties to address many of the difficult conceptual issues which
surround the recognition of aboriginal self-government. ... We received little inthe way of
submissions that would help us to grapple with these difficult and central issues. Without
assistance from the parties, it wouldbe imprudent for the Court to step into the breach.";
ibid. at 1115.
62 Ibid. at 1082-83 ; emphasis added.
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This point has two important ramifications .63 First, the manner in which the
members of the group use their aboriginal lands is presumptively governed by
theinternallaw ofthegroup. So, ineffect, theconceptof aboriginal title supplies
a protective legal umbrella, in the shelter of which customary land law may
develop and flourish. Second, since. decisions with respect to the lands must be
made by the community, there must be some internal structure for communal
decision-making.
.
The need foradecision-making structureprovides an important cornerstone
for the right ofaboriginal self-government. At a minimum, an aboriginal group
has theinherent rightto make communal decisions abouthow its lands are tobe
used . In particular, the group may determine how to apportion thelands among
group members, make grants and other dispositions of the communal property,
lay down laws and regulations governing land-use, impose taxes relating to the
land, determine how any land-based revenues are to be expended, and so on.
Since aboriginal title is itself a generic right, .it,follows that the right to make
communal decisions about aboriginal lands is also a generic rightwhose basic
legal contours do not vary from group to group. Nevertheless, the precise
application ofthis right and the particular modalities of self government thatit
supports will clearly be governed by factors specific to the.group .
Our discussion is summarized in the following diagram:

IGINAL RIGHTS
GENERIC
I
ABORIGINAL
RIGHT
LANGUAGE
RIGHTS
TITLE
OF
SELF-GOVERNMENT

B . . Proving

SPECIFIC
I .
SITESPECIFIC
RIGHTS

FLOATING
RIGHTS

CULTURAL
RIGHTS

Specific' Rights

In Van derPeet, the SupremeCourtholds that, inorderto qualify as a specific aboriginal
right, an activity must be based on a practice, custom or tradition that was integral
to the distinctive culture ofthe specific aboriginal group prior to European contact64
63 See discussion in K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada : From Title to Land to
Territorial Sovereignty", supra note 53.
64 R: v. Van der Peet, supra note 7 at 549, 554-55 .
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This criterion has two basic facets . First, the practice, custom or tradition must
have been integral to the culture of the aboriginal group; that is, it must have
been a "central and significant" part of the culture, one of the things that made
the society what it was. So aspects of an aboriginal society that were only
"incidental or occasional" do not qualify ; they need to have been "defining and
central attributes"ofthesociety.65 A practice must have constituted a distinctive
or characteristic element of the society; however, there is no need to show that
the practice was unique to the group or different from the practices of other
societies .66
Second, the practice, custom or tradition must have been integral to the
aboriginal society in the period prior to European contact. 67 For a modern
activity to qualify as an aboriginal right, itmust have continuity with pre-contact
practices, customs or traditions . Nevertheless, aboriginal rights are not frozen
in the form that they assumed in pre-contact times but may evolve into modern
forms that represent an adaptation to new conditions 68 The fact that a precontact practice, custom or tradition has changed in response to the arrival of
Europeans does not necessarily break the chain of continuity . However, a
practice, custom or tradition that arose solely or primarily as a response to
European influences will not meet the required standard. 69

In effect, the second requirement holds that specific aboriginal rights must
be of a certain vintage. They must find their origins in a stock of practices,
customs and traditions that existed at a particular threshold date . In Van der
Peet, Lamer C.J. holds that the appropriate threshold date is the time of
"contact", when the particular aboriginal people first encountered Europeans .
He rejects alternative threshold dates such as the time that a European state first
asserted sovereignty over the aboriginal people in question, or the time that the
Crown established effective governmental authority in the area.
The significance of this approach is demonstrated by the facts in Van der
Peet . The appellant, a member ofthe Sto:lo nation, was chargedwith selling fish
caughtunderan Indian foodfishinglicence. Theapplicable regulationsprohibited
the sale of fish caught under such a licence. The appellant argued that the
regulations infringed her aboriginal right to sell fish and were invalid under s.
35(1), Constitution Act, 1982 . At trial, the court found that prior to European
contact the Sto :lo had traded fish only casually or for ceremonial purposes ;
however, once Europeans established themselves in the region, the Sto:lo
developed a well-defined trade in fish with the Hudson's Bay Company. On
these facts, the Supreme Court ruled that the appellant had failed to show the
existence ofan aboriginal right, since the evidence was insufficient to establish
Ibid. at 553.
Ibid. at 560-61 .
67 Ibid. at 554-55 .
68 Ibid. at 556-67.
69 Ibid. at 561-62, 570. The Court uses the term "solely" at 562 but adopts the term
"primarily" in applying the criterion to the facts at 570.
65
66
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that the trade in fish was an integralpart of Sto:lo society at the time ofEuropean
contact. The trade with the Hudson's Bay Companywas qualitatively different
from that existing on contact and, arose primarily as a result of European
influence; as such, it coùldnot help theappellant's case .7() However, the Court's
ruling might well have been different had it chosen the-time of Crown
sovereignty ,as the threshold date, since the trade with the Hudson's Bay
Company had emerged by that date 71
We may observe that the Court's choice of threshold date is somewhat
puzzling 72 In British imperial law, the simple fact of "contact" between the
Crown and indigenous peoples had no legal significance . Contact did not give
indigenous peoples any rights in British law; nor didit have any legal impact on
indigenous systems of law. and rights . Contact was a.legally innocent event. It
was only when the Crown acquired jurisdiction over.a territory that the issue of
the rights of the local inhabitants arose in British law. Only at this point could
the doctrine of aboriginal rights come into play. So, while it would not be
impossible for the doctrine to recognize only customary rights that existed at
someprior date,of"contact", inpractice this would be astrange andinconvenient
way for the doctrine to operate. It would have made it virtually impossible for
British officials onthe spot atthetime toknow which asserted aboriginalrights
they should respect, without a battery of historians and anthropologists at their
elbows . Not surprisingly, there seems to be no historical evidence that imperial
law actually, functioned in this manner . .
In the subsequent case of I)elgamuukw, the Court ruled that the threshold
datefor aboriginaltitle was thetime of Crownsovereignty rather than contact.73
The Court aptly observed that, since aboriginal title was a burden on the
Crown's underlying title, it did not make sense to speak of its existence prior to
the date of sovereignty. However, the Court did not overrule the Van der Peet
criterion as it applies to specific rights. This gives rise to an odd discrepancy.
Suppose that an aboriginal group of hunters moved into a certain area after the
date ofcontactbut substantially before the date of Crown sovereignty 74 Under
current law, the group . would apparently be precluded from showing an
aboriginal right to hunt in the area; however, paradoxically, itmight be able to
establish aboriginaltitlethere, despitethe fact thataboriginaltitlewouldinclude
70 Ibid. at 564-71 .
71 Ibid. at 532.
72 For discussion, see K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights : What's
the Connection?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 117, at 118,128-33; J. Borrows, "The Trickster:
Integral to, a Distinctive Culture" (1997) 8:2 Constitutional Forum 27.
73 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 52 at 1098-99. For discussion, see
K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in Canada : From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty",
supra note 53.
74 In some parts .of Canada, contact, took place long before the date that sovereignty
was asserted or achieved. In the interval, there was often considerable movement among
aboriginal groups, as people migrated from one area to another inresponse to suchfactors
as war, internal strife, trade opportunities; and changing ecological conditions .
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hunting rights . In effect, the test for the lesser right is more onerous than for the
greaterright. The anomaly is compounded where Group A occupied the area at
the time of contact but had been displaced by Group B by the time of
sovereignty. Here, Group A could show a specific aboriginalrightto huntin the
areabutnotaboriginaltitle. Bycontrast, Group B could show aboriginal title but
not a specific right to hunt. Such complications suggest the need a common
historical baseline for establishing both aboriginal title and specific aboriginal
rights .
Of course, the Court's approach to specific rights in Van der Peet has a
plausibleexplanation. Theaboriginal right assertedthere involvedthe exploitation
of limited fishing resources - resources that the aboriginal group likely shared
with otheruser groups, including commercial and sports fishers, as well as other
aboriginal groups . No doubt, the Court was concerned about the impact of a
favourable ruling on other user groups . However, it seems doubtful whether
adopting an artificial threshold date is the best way to solve this problem. In the
end, the equitable sharing of resources is better attained through governmental
regulations that meet the standards of section 35(1), coupled with agreements
with the groups concerned.
What is the alternative to the Van der Peet approach? We suggest that
specific aboriginal rights may be proven in either of two ways :
Historical evidence showing that the right was a recognized strand in the
fiduciary relationship established at the time when the Crown assumed
governmental responsibility fortheparticular aboriginalpeople in question
(the "transition date") . The evidence could consist of official practice,
legislation, negotiations or treaties, andit could emanateeither from the era
when the Crown assumedresponsibility, orfrom periodsbefore orafter that
era, so long as it tended to show the basic terms of the relationship at the
transition date.
(2) Proofthat the rightis grounded inpractices, customs or traditions that were
integral to the distinctive culture of the specific aboriginal group at the
transition date.
The second criterion can be linked to the first in the following way. Ifit can be
proven that an activity was integral to the culture of the aboriginal group, it is
presumed to have formed an incident in the fiduciary burden assumed by the
Crown, even in the absence of specific historical evidence to this effect .
C. Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Rights

Someaboriginal rights are exclusive. They give an aboriginal group the sole
right to engage in certain activities, to use and occupy a tract of land, to exploit
particular resources, and so on. The holders of the rightarethe only ones entitled
to exercise it, and they can maintain the right against the entire world. For
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example, where a grouphas aboriginal title to a certaintract of land, it generally
has the sole right to occupy and use the land and exploitits resources?s No one
outside the group is entitled to occupy the land, and the group has the right to
expel trespassers. For most practicalpurposes, the aboriginal group "owns" the
land.

Aboriginal title is perhaps the clearest example of an exclusive aboriginal
right. However, it is not necessarily the only one. For example, an aboriginal
group mighthave exclusive rights to certain songs andstories that are a central
partofthe group's culturalheritage . Since therightis exclusive, persons outside
the group would not be able to reproduce those songs and stories without the
group's permission . The group would have a kind of aboriginal "copyright" _to
them.
Other aboriginal rights are non-exclusive. While they give an aboriginal
group theright to engage in certain activities -such as to use a tract of land or
to exploit a resource - they do not give the group sole benefitof theright orthe
capacity to prevent others from exercising corresponding rights . Suppose, for
example, that a certain group has an aboriginal right to hold potlaches as a
central,part ofits cultural heritage ; however, at common law,, the general public
are also free to hold potlaches if they want to. Here the group's aboriginal right
does not entitle ittopreventothers from engaging in thesame activity . Itis anonexclusive right.
What, then, is the legal status of a non-exclusive aboriginal right? Clearly
it does notcarrythe same legal clout as an exclusiveright. Nevertheless, in some
contexts, a non-exclusive aboriginal right will have greater weight than a
corresponding common law right. This difference flows from the distinctive
origins and character ofthe aboriginal right. Aboriginal rights are governed by
a unique fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples 76
Under this relationship, the Crown has the duty to protect the basic rights and
interests of the aboriginalpeoples. .One effect of this duty is to restrain the hand
of the Crown itself in its dealings with aboriginal peoples and their rights . So,
legislation should generally be interpretedin amannerfavourable to aboriginal
and treaty rights . By contrast, rights held by the general public do not generally
benefit from a similar rule of statutory interpretation.
Non-exclusive aboriginal rights may also furnish, the policy basis for
statutory differentiations between the rights of aboriginal peoples and those of
the general public . For example, a non-exclusive aboriginal right to fish may
provide, the rationale for statutory provisions granting special fishing privileges
to aboriginal peoples, beyond those held by the .public. This sort of statutory
differentiation maybe shielded from Charterscrutiny by s. 25of the Constitution
Act, 1982, which provides that the Charter shall. not be construed so as to
Nevertheless, two or more aboriginal groups may hold overlapping aboriginal titles
to the same tract of land; Delgamuukw'v . .British Columbia, supra note 52 at 1105-06.
76
R. v . Sparrow, supra note 33 at 1107-10; R. v. Van derPeet, supra note 7 at 536-37.
75
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derogate from the aboriginal, treaty and other rights held by the aboriginal
peoples of Canada. Where a statute differentiates between an aboriginal group
and the general public, it may be immune to challenge under the Charter if the
purpose of the differentiation is protect aboriginal rights, even where those
rights are non-exclusive in character.
Inothercases, legislativeprovisions may give specialprotection to aboriginal
or treaty rights on a global basis . For example, s. 88 ofthe Indian Act states that
all provincial laws of general application are applicable to Indians, subject to
"the terms of any treaty".77 The effect of the latter qualification is to shield
treaty rights (both exclusive and non-exclusive) from restrictions imposed by
general provincial legislation - restrictions that would apply to comparable
rights held by the generalpublic . So, for example, anon-exclusive hunting right
enshrined in a treaty would be protectedfrom provincial legislation under s. 88.
Of course, the prime instance of such protective legislation is s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms "existing aboriginal and
treaty rights" andshelters themfrom governmental limitation and infringement .
D. The Coexistence of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Rights
Some exclusive aboriginal rights, although in principle held against the
wholeworld, may coexist withthe exclusive rights of otherparties. Conversely,
some non-exclusive aboriginal rights may qualify the exclusive rights of other
parties in unexpected ways . These complications merit a closer look.
In principle an exclusive right takes effect against the entire world.
Nevertheless, inpractice such a right sometimes overlaps with exclusive rights
held by other parties. For example, where a group has an exclusive aboriginal
righttopickberries in a certain area, in principle the onlypersons entitled topick
berries there are group members. Suppose however that the area encompasses
a tract of land owned by a private individual . So long as the tract is not actually
occupied by the owner in a manner that effectively precludes berry-picking, it
seems that in some cases the aboriginal rightmay apply to the tract and co-exist
withtheprivate owner's rights .78 Here therights of the aboriginal group and the
private owner are both exclusive; in principle they both take effect against the
entire world. However, in practice the rights co-exist and overlap; neither
operates to the complete exclusion of the other. In effect, both the aboriginal
group and the private owner are entitled to pick berries in the tract. Again,
consider a situation where two distinct indigenous groups have aboriginal rights
to fish at the same location on a river bank. In each case, the aboriginal right is
exclusive and holds good against the entire world. Since both rights are held in
respect of the same fishing station, neither aboriginal group has the right to
77 R.S.C. 1985, c.1-5.
7s This result appears
to follow from the ruling in R. v. Badger, supra note 41 at 790809, discussed below.
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preventthe otherfrom fishing there.Here,thetwo groups have shared exclusive
rights, which co-exist and overlap.79
So farwe have considered only exclusive rights . However, non-exclusive
rights may also overlap withother rights . Consider the case where an aboriginal
group holds a non-exclusive treaty right to hunt in an area that comprises some
privately-ownedland. This non-exclusive right mayco-exist with the exclusive
rights of the private owners, so long as the private land is not occupied in a
manner that precludes the exercise of the hunting right. For example, in the
Badger case,80 the Supreme Court considered the effect of a clause in the
NaturalResources TransferAgreement,1930, whichprovides that Indians have
the right of hunting, trapping and fishing for food on unoccupied Crown lands
and on any other lands to which they have. a "right of access" . The Court held
that this provision should be read in the light of Treaty No. 8 of 1899, which
undertakes that theIndian parties have theright to hunt, trap andfishthroughout
the territory surrendered in the Treaty, excepting such tracts taken up "for
settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes". We may note that
this,right appears to be non-exclusive, in the sense that it does not preclude
others from hunting in the, same territory. The Court ruled that under these
provisions theIndians were entitled to hunt on privately-ownedland, so long as
the lands were not put to visible, use that was incompatible with hunting. In
effect, a non-exclusive hunting right co-exists with the otherwise exclusive
rights of private land-owners.
These distinctions are complicated by the fact that aboriginal rights and
treaty rights - exclusive and non-exclusive,alike -enjoy the protection of s.
35(1) ofthe Constitution Act, 1982 . So, even where a non-exclusive aboriginal
or treaty right replicates a common law right held by the general public, the
aboriginal or treaty right will have the benefit of a constitutional shield not
enjoyed by the common law right. For example, in the Marshall case,81 the
Supreme Court considered asituationwhere aMi'kmaq group held treaty rights
to hunt, fish and trade that arguably replicated rights held by the general public
at common law. Justice Binnie held that a general right enjoyed by all citizens
could nevertheless be made, the subject of an enforceable treaty promise. The
effect of the' treaty promise was not necessarily to confer preferential rights on
the aboriginal parties. However, even if the treaty did not enhance the content
of the rights, it affected the level of legal protection they enjoyed. Where a
statute imposes restrictions on the exercise of the treaty rights; the restrictions
will not take effect unless justified under s. 35(1), Constitution Act, 1982 .
Justice Binnie observed that the fact that the content of Mi'kmaq rights under
the treaty was no greater than that enjoyed by the general public did not detract
from the higher protection the treaty afforded the -Mi'kmaq people under s.
35(1).
79

The concept of "shared exclusivity" is discussed in

Columbia, supra note 52 at 1105-06.
so R . v . Badger, supra note 41 at 790-809 .
91 R. v. Marshall, supra note 40 at paras. 45-48.
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By implication, the Marshall case supports theparallel proposition that the
enactment of s. 35(1) did not normally convert non-exclusive rights into
exclusive rights . Suppose that prior to 1982 a group had an aboriginal right to
fish in a certain area. The right was non-exclusive and replicated the fishing
rights of the general public at common law . Absent unusual circumstances, it
seems that s. 35(1) would not transform this non-exclusive right into an
exclusive one.After 1982, the general public wouldstillbe free to fish in the area
at common law. Nevertheless, under s. 35(1), the aboriginal right would gain a
measure of constitutional protection from statutory infringement that the
common law right would not possess.
E. Depletable and Non-Depletable Rights
Aboriginal rights may also be classified as depletable and non-depletable.
Depletable rights are rights whose exercise tends to use up some portion of a
finite material resource - whether renewable (like fish and trees) or non
renewable (like minerals). By contrast, the exercise of non-depletable rights
does not involve the consumption of a finite material resource. This distinction
is a practical one, which does not pretend to absolute analytical rigour .
Obviously, anyhuman activity involves the use of certain finite resources (such
as space and energy). So, in this broad sense, virtually every right has resource
implications because certain amounts of space and energy are needed to
exercise it . When we speak of depletable rights, we have something more
specific in mind - rights whose resource implications significantly transcend
the routine effects of human activity .
Where a depletable right is non-exclusive, the exercise of the right will
obviously affect the amount of the resource available to other user-groups whether temporarily or permanently . For example, if an aboriginal group
exercises its non-exclusive right to fish in certain waters, its activities will
diminishthe stockoffish availablethat season for otherusers and may also have
long-term effects on the stock's capacity to reproduce itself. Even where a
depletable right is exclusive, it may affect the rights of others . For example, the
exercise ofanexclusive aboriginal rightto fish in certain waters will often affect
the rights of user-groups in other waters, since fish are a mobile resource and
migrate from area to area.
By contrast, non-depletable rights do not have significant resource
implications. The right to speak an aboriginal language is a good example.
When members of the Cree nation exercise their right to speak their ancestral
tongue, they do not lessen the capacity of non-Cree people to speak the
language. Rather, by keeping their language alive and flourishing, native Cree
speakers enhance the opportunity of outsiders to learn and enjoy the language .
In other words, when people speak their mother tongue, they do not make
"withdrawals" from a finite account in a language bank. They contribute to the
language bank andenrich its resources -which in principle are available to the
entire world.
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Depletable rights may be further sub-divided into limited and unlimited
rights . Limited depletable rights have built-in legal restrictions that help to
'conserve the material resource or to safeguard the rights of other user-groups.
In some cases, the scope of the right may be determined by the amount of the
resource available at any given time. For example, a group might have the
aboriginal right to fish in a certain area, subject to a built-in limit that ensures
that enough fish remain forthe stockto reproduceitself. Inothercases, the scope
of the right may be limited internally by the purpose that it serves - such as a
right to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes but not for commercial
purposes,82 or the right to trade the products of fishing and hunting so as to
support a "moderate livelihood" but not the_ "accumulation of wealth" .
Bycontrast, unlimiteddepletable rights do nothave built-inlegalrestrictions
and so in principle may be exercised so as to exhaust the material resource in
question. So, for example, an aboriginal group might have the exclusive right
to exploit a mineral resource found on certain lands. Here the right could well
be unlimited, in that it does not prevent the entire mineral resource from being
used up. Of course, the fact that an aboriginal or treaty right is unlimited as a
matter ofinternal definition does notnecessarilypreventit frombeing regulated
by aboriginal governments or by public legislation that satisfies the standards
laid down under s. 35(1), Constitution Act, 1982 .
The main significance of the distinction between depletable and nondepletable rights lies in the constitutional arena. The entrenchment ofaboriginal
and treaty rights in s. 35(1) has greater implications for depletable rights than
non-depletable rights, because it may affect the distribution of the resource
among the various user-groups. By contrast, the entrenchment of a nondepletable right does not have this effect, because the exercise of such a right
does not diminish the capacity of others to exercise equivalent rights . So, in
applying s. 35(1), there is good reason to distinguish between depletable and
non-depletable rights and to apply different standards to them.
Conclusion
We have argued that the foundations of aboriginal and treaty rights lie in the
common law doctrine of aboriginal rights, which originated in ancient intersocietal custom generated by interaction between the Crown and indigenous
peoples, as informed by basic principles ofjustice. This sui generic doctrine is
part ofthe common law of Canada and operates uniformly across the country;
italso provides the context for interpreting section35(1) ofthe ConstitutionAct,
1982, The doctrine of aboriginal rights has à number of distinct branches . One
branch governs treaties between indigenous peoples and the Crown, and
determines their basic status, existence, interpretation and effects. Another
82 See R. v. Sparrow, supra note 33 at 1099-1101 .
83 R. v. Marshall, supra note 40 at paras. 57-61 .
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branch deals with the various types of aboriginal rights, including aboriginal
title and the right of self-government. So doing, the doctrine distinguishes
between generic and specific rights, exclusive and non-exclusive rights, and
depletable and non-depletable rights . Still other branches of the doctrine
articulate the principles governing the operation of aboriginal customary law
and the fiduciary role of the Crown. In brief, the common law doctrine of
aboriginal rights provides the basic frame within which particular aboriginal
and treaty rights may be identified. It is our mappamundi .

